Economic Strategy

Economic Strategy

Strategies for Reducing Economic Corruption and Its Impact on National Identity in Iran and Developing Countries: A Modern Institutional Economics Approach

Document Type : Original Article

Author
Seyyed Mohsen Azimi Dokht Shouroki
Faculty Member, Faculty of Economics, Baft Higher Education Complex, Shahid Bahonar, Kerman, Iran.
10.22034/es.2026.530910.1868
Abstract
Economic corruption, a critical barrier to sustainable development, undermines public trust and institutions, threatening national identity in developing countries, particularly Iran. Conventional economics, with its focus on market efficiency, fails to address the institutional roots of corruption, whereas new institutional economics, emphasizing laws, norms, and organizations, provides a robust framework for analyzing corruption and national identity. This study investigates the impact of economic corruption on national identity and proposes policy strategies, employing the new institutional economics framework and panel data for 10 selected countries (Iran, India, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, Pakistan, Egypt, Argentina) over 2010–2022. A fixed effects model, incorporating GDP per capita and political stability as control variables, was estimated. Results indicate that corruption (coefficient -0.420, p < 0.01) significantly reduces national identity, while GDP per capita (coefficient 0.280, p < 0.05) and political stability (coefficient 0.350, p < 0.01) enhance it. In Iran, sanctions and institutional weaknesses exacerbate corruption’s impact. The study underscores the need for institutional reforms, such as enhancing financial transparency, judicial independence, and anti-corruption culture. These findings offer practical implications for policymaking in Iran and developing countries, with novelty in applying new institutional economics to empirically analyze national identity and highlight the limitations of conventional economics.
Keywords
Economic Corruption
National Identity
New Institutional Economics
Iran
Developing Countries
Subjects
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  • Receive Date 09 October 2025
  • Revise Date 27 December 2025
  • Accept Date 25 February 2026