Economic Strategy

Economic Strategy

The Role of Communication in Conserving Common Natural Resources and Providing Policy Recommendations for the Implementation of General Environmental and Natural Resources Policies: An Experimental Laboratory Study

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Hamideh Esfahani 1
Mehdi Fadaei 2
Vahid Barsiah 3
1 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics and Systems, Institute for Management and Planning Studies, Tehran, Iran,
2 Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Systems, Institute for Management and Planning Studies, Tehran, Iran,
3 Corresponding author, PhD candidate in Economics, Institute for Management and Planning Studies, Tehran, Iran
10.22034/es.2025.499258.1830
Abstract
Given the country's comprehensive approach towards the protection, development, and sustainable utilization of common natural resources as outlined in the general environmental and natural resources policies, the present study focuses on the role of group dialogue in the conservation of common natural resources. Users of common natural resources or common pool resources face a conflict between individual and collective interests, similar to players in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. This conflict arises from the free-rider problem and negative externalities, leading individuals to adopt non-cooperative strategies as their dominant strategy. Consequently, theory predicts that the degradation of common natural resources is inevitable and expected. This research aims to simulate the tragedy of the commons phenomenon using a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Through a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether introducing communication and dialogue opportunities among subjects in the game can alter their behavior towards increased cooperation, potentially resulting in reduced degradation of common natural resources. The common pool resource game (a variant of the Prisoner's Dilemma) was designed using the Otree software. Data collection for this study was conducted through an online economic laboratory experiment and an online questionnaire, involving 104 subjects from various universities across the country (predominantly from universities in Tehran). To analyze the results and findings, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression method was employed. The primary finding of this study suggests that communication and dialogue between subjects can lead to increased cooperation and reduced degradation of common natural resources.
Keywords
Common natural resource
common pool resource (CPR)
tragedy of the commons
group dialogue
communication
Prisoner's Dilemma game
simulation
online economic laboratory
Otree

Subjects

بشرپور، سجاد؛ طاهری‌فرد، مینا و محمدی، گلاویژ (1398). ویژگی‌های روانسنجی نسخه فارسی فرم کوتاه پرسش‌نامه شخصیتی هگزاکو ـ24 سؤالی در دانشجویان. فصلنامه اندازه گیری تربیتی، 9(36)، 89-65.
حسینی‌فرد، سیدمحمد؛ توحیدی‌نیا، ابوالقاسم و نادران، الیاس (1401). مقایسه اثر دینداری بر تولید کالای عمومی و حفظ منبع طبیعی: یک مطالعه آزمایشگاهی. فصلنامه سیاست‌های مالی واقتصادی، ۱۰(۳۹)، ۷-۴۱.
نظرپور، محمدتقی (1384). آزمون‌های تجربی در اقتصاد و کاربرد آن در اقتصاد اسلامی. اقتصاد اسلامی، (17).
 
Andreoni, J. (1993). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: Experimental evidence. The economic journal, 103(418), 570-585.
Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. science, 211(4489), 1390-1396.
Balliet, D. (2010). Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A MetaAnalytic Review. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(1), 39-57.
Buchan, N.; Johnson, E. & Croson, R. (2006). Let's get personal: An international examination of the influence of communication, culture and social distance on other regarding preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60(3), 373.
Cartwright, E. (2018). Behavioral economics. Routledge.
Chen, D.; Schonger, M. & Wickens, C. (2016). OTree-An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, (9), 88-97.
Cross, J. & Guyer, M. (1980). Social Traps. Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press.
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual review of psychology, 31(1), 169-193.
Dawes, R.; McTavish, J. & Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people’s behavior in a commons dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(1), 1-11.
Dawes, R.; Mirels, H.; Gold, E. & Donahue (1993). Equating inverse probabilities in implicit personality judgments. Psychological Science, 4(6), 396-400.
E. de Vries, R.; C. Ashton, M. & Lee, K. (2009). De zes belangrijkste persoonlijkheidsdimensies en de HEXACO Persoonlijkheidsvragenlijst. Gedrag en Organisatie, (22), 232-274.
Fehr, E. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 9(4), 980-994.
Fischbacher, U. & Gächter, S. (2010). Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public goods experiments. American economic review, 100(1), 541-556.
Fischbacher, U.; Gächter, S. & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics letters, 71(3), 397-404.
Forsythe, R.; Horowitz, J.; Savin, N. & Sef. (1994). Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games and Economic behavior, 6(3), 347-369.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, (162), 1243-1248.
Hoenow, N. & Pourviseh, A. (2024). Intragroup communication in social dilemmas: An artefactual public good field experiment in small-scale communities. Judgment and Decision Making, (19).
Hoffman, E.; McCabe, K. & Smith, V. (1996). Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games. The American economic review, 86(3), 653-660.
Hogg, M. & Turner, J. (1987). Intergroup behaviour, self‐stereotyping and the salience of social categories. British Journal of Social Psychology, 26(4), 325-340.
Kerr, N. & Kaufman-Gilliland, C. (1994). Communication, commitment, and cooperation in social dilemma. Journal of personality and social psychology, 66(3), 513.
Kocher, M.; Cherry, T.; Kroll, S. & Netzer, R. (2008). Conditional cooperation on three continents. Economics letters, 101(3), 175-178.
Kramer, R. & Brewer, M. (1984). Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma. Journal of personality and social psychology, 46(5), 1044.
Kurzban, R. (2001). The social psychophysics of cooperation: Nonverbal communication in a public goods game. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior,(25), 241-259.
Messick, D. M. (1983). Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas. Journal of personality and social psychology, 44(2), 294.
Platt, J. (1973). Social traps. American Psychologist, 28(8), 641-651.
Roth, A. (1995). Bargaining experiments. Handbook of experimental economics, (1), 253-348.
Slonim, R. & Roth, A. (1998). Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak Republic. Econometrica, 569-596.
Wilson, R. & Sell, J. (1997). Liar, liar...” Cheap talk and reputation in repeated public goods settings. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(5), 695-717.
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of Personality and social Psychology, 51(1), 110.

  • Receive Date 12 January 2025
  • Revise Date 02 May 2025
  • Accept Date 04 June 2025