Iranian Budgeting System since Constitutional Revolution: is based on Personal Identity and has Inefficient Political Equilibrium with both Economic and Law Disequilibrium

We study the evolution of Iranian budgeting system since constitutional revolution, and show that this system is an inefficient political equilibrium that leads to both economic and law disequilibrium. In this structure, both executive branch and parliament are dissatisfy from the process of budgeting system (approve, performance, and monitoring) and also their rule in this process. Moreover, it has various economic costs in national level (including incomplete public investment and faulty financial and monetary cycles) which leads to dissatisfaction from budget allocation.
Based on social order framework, it has been shown that significant part of the process of budgeting in Iran is personal, and it is a major character for inefficient equilibrium of Iranian budgeting system .Focusing on the rule of the Head of Budget Integration Commission in approval stage of budgeting process, and focusing on the rule of the Head of Program and Budget Organization in implementation stage, we show that two mentioned person have remarkable discretion in decision making. We also focused on budget accounting reports in monitoring stage, and show these reports have little efficiency.